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RESURRECTING INCIPIENCY:
FROM VON'S GROCERY TO CONSUMER CHOICE
ROBERT

H.

LANDE*

The merger incipiency doctrine could return. It was conceived in the
Celler-Kefauver Act, born in Brown Shoe, and achieved maturity in Von's
Grocery. The doctrine soon began to decline and repeatedly has been
pronounced dead. This essay will sketch the origin, meaning, and reasons
for the decline of the doctrine. It will show how parts survive today. It
will then examine whether a plausible basis exists for reviving significantly
stricter or more prophylactic merger enforcement through the incipiency doctrine.
This essay will show that there are aspects of the doctrine that could
be revived without returning to the misguided Von's Grocery approach to
the issue. It will show, for example, how the concept could in part
be resurrected if merger enforcement's primary focus returned to its
intellectual foundation: a concern with consumer choice.' During the
Reagan Administration, the sole goal of their permissive merger enforcement policy, a policy that largely ignored the incipiency doctrine, was
increased economic efficiency.2 A return to enforcement based upon
the consumer choice standard 3 could help to revitalize more aggressive

* Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, and Senior Research
Scholar, American Antitrust Institute. The author is grateful to Neil Averitt, Jonathan
Baker, William Blumenthal, Stephen Calkins, Malcolm Coate, Mark Cunningham, Alan
Fisher, Warren Grimes, Stephen Ross, Mary Lou Steptoe and, especially, to Albert Foer,
for helpful suggestions, and to Kelly Phillips and Michaela Roberts for research assistance.
I Under a consumer choice approach to antitrust, customers are entitled to the array
of options that a market without the anticompetitive arrangement would have provided
to them. Customers are entitled to a competitive array of both price and non price options.
For a more extensive discussion of the meaning of a consumer choice standard, see infra
Parts IV and V and notes 3 and 94.
2 For a discussion of Reagan Administration merger enforcement, see infra Part IV.
S A choice approach to antitrust differs from an efficiency approach in several ways.
First, it gives more emphasis to nonprice issues (which are, in theory, accounted for in
efficiency analysis, but often are ignored as a practical matter). Second, a choice standard
includes a concern with wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market power
caused by an absence of price-related options. Third, a choice standard would sometimes
value having additional options as an end in itself. (Of course, a preference for a larger
number of options, even if this could raise costs, can be expressed as an efficiency concern
875
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enforcement. 4 This essay also will discuss other ways-including the
concern that a transaction might lead to a merger trend or wave, and a
"sliding scale" approach to especially large transactions in highly concentrated industries-in which the Merger Guidelines and merger enforcement and decisions could become even more faithful to the
Congressional goals underlying the incipiency doctrine.
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE INCIPIENCY DOCTRINE

The incipiency doctrine originated in the Celler-Kefauver Amendment
to the Clayton Act5 and in the earliest Supreme Court interpretations
of the prohibition against mergers the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly."6 In Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States,? the Supreme Court laid the foundation for the
doctrine by blocking a horizontal merger that would have increased the
defendant's market share from 5.6 percent of the national market for
shoes to 7.2 percent, an increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) of less than 20. 8 The Court explained that because of a "rising
tide of economic concentration-[Congress wanted mergers to be
blocked] at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a
line of commerce was still in its incipiency... [Congress wanted to] brake
this force at its outset and before it gathered momentum."9 Some immediinsofar as this would place a value upon and incorporate the value of diversity.) For a
more extensive discussion of the meaning of a consumer choice standard, see infra Parts
IV and V and Averitt & Lande articles, infra note 95.
4 Whether more robust enforcement would be desirable is beyond the scope of this
essay. So is the question of how strict merger enforcement should be. This essay will,
however, focus upori several bases upon which revitalized enforcement could be founded.
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 18. For an analysis of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act
on the incipiency issue, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316-17 (1962);
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAw OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 599 (2000); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency View Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65, 130-40 (1982).
615 U.S.C. § 18.
7370 U.S. 294 (1962).
8 The market shares were different for different categories of shoes. See id. at 347-54
(app. A, B, and C) (charting the market shares separately for women's, children's, and
men's shoes). The opinion did not, however, calculate the change in HHI.
9 See id. at 317-18. Several excerpts from the Court's analysis of the Act's legislative
history follow: "The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950
amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration
in the American economy." [d. at 315. Further, the Court held: "[Ilt is apparent that a
keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic
concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the
trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.
Congress saw the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it
sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this
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ate threats to competition also might have played a role in the Court's
decision, including much higher increases in concentration in a number
of local geographic markets. lo Moreover, the opinion never defined the
incipiency concept clearly. Nevertheless, the doctrine was born.
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank ll repeated the incipiency

language. The context made the reference largely dictum, however,
because the merging parties had market shares of approximately 15
percent and 20 percent, and the merger would have increased the HHI
by approximately 600 to a HHI level of 2,000. 12 These structural factors
were substantially above the necessary level that could help cause a
merger to be challenged today. It is therefore un surprising that the
opinion did not define or clarifY the meaning of the incipiency doctrine.
Von's Grocery, 13 which soon followed, is often considered the quintessential incipiency case. 14 In Von's Grocery the Court blocked a merger that
would have created a grocery store chain which controlled approximately
7.5 percent of grocery sales in the relevant market. IS Although the earlier
decisions arguably were justified by significan t increases in concentration,
not even a sympathetic reading of Von's Grocery can ignore the fact that
the proposed merger would have led to an increase in the HHI of less
than 20 in a market whose HHI concentration level would have been
force at its outset and before it gathered momentum." Id. at 317-18 ("Acquisitions of
stock or assets have a cumulative effect, and control of the market ... may be achieved
not in a single acquisition but as the result of a series of acquisitions. The bill is intended
to permit intervention in such a cumulative process when the effect of an acquisition may
be a significant reduction in the vigor of competition."); S. REp. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 4-5 ("The intent here ... is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their
incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act
proceeding."). The Report of the HouseJudiciary Committee on H.R. 515 recommended
the adoption of tests more stringent than those in the Sherman Act. H.R. REp. No.
596, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7. See generally Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315-24. The "rising"
concentration that was of concern to Congress could have been concentration within
particular industries, or concentration generally throughout the economy.
10 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 347-50 (app. A). The merging firms had large market
shares in dozens of towns and small and medium sized cities, including market shares of
23.3% and 34.4% in Dodge City, for example, an HHI increase of 1603. See id.
II 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
12 These figures are approximations, and the HHls were not in the opinion. The precise
numbers depend upon whether the market is measured in terms of assets, deposits, or
loans. See id. at 330-3l. Of course, if this same merger were considered today, a number
of factors would be considered in addition to market share and concentration level, and
the relevant market might not be defined the same way.
13
384 U.S. 270 (1966).
14 It might be considered the quintessential incipiency case because it involved none of
the complications of the earlier decisions.
15 See 384 U.S. at 272.
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less than 300. 16 Not surprisingly, Von's Grocery often is "credited" as being
the high point, if not the actual origin, of the doctrine. But, what, exactly,
did "incipiency" mean?
II. POSSIBLE MEANINGS OF THE INCIPIENCY DOCTRINE
The legislative history and decisions that gave rise to the incipiency
doctrine are disappointingly vague. As a result, although it is clear that
the concept calls for strict antimerger enforcement, no firm definition
of incipiency has been established. The doctrine can be understood in
at least five possible ways:

I'

1. The incipiency doctrine prohibits even very small decreases in competition.

Before the Clayton Act was passed, the Sherman Act prevented mergers
likely to lead to a monopoly, or even the dangerous probability of one. IS
Congress did not, however, consider this approach to merger enforce16 These calculations are based upon the numbers in Justice White's concurrence. See
id. at 280-81 (White, j., concurring). The precise market shares for the merging com-

panies and for their competitors were of course different in different years. Further, if
the market were defined differently-for example, in terms of chain stores-the HHI
numbers would change.
Some of the criticism of Von s Grocery might be unwarranted. Richard Stern notes:
The decision was widely reviled because the combined market share of Von's
and Shopping Bag was quite small, as measured using as denominator (universe)
a Los Angeles County market or a LA County + Orange County market. But that
was an unrealistic market in that customers would not drive more than a few
minutes. For example, nobody would drive from West Los Angeles to Whittier
for groceries. The countywide % data thus understated the market impact of the
merger. The "tme" market was a set of overlapping roughly circular zones centered on each supermarket location, where each (sub) market border had a
somewhat indeterminate contour. Each customer had a slightly different distance
it would drive. Hence the market border around each supermarket location was
like a contour map, say a target where 100% of customers would be willing to
drive to the supermarket if they lived 0 distance (the bull's-eye of the target),
80% if they lived within 5 blocks, 60% if they lived within 10 blocks, 40% if they
lived 15 blocks, etc. Or you could represent the market as a spatter print,with
the ink dots very close together near the supermarket and farther apart radially
out ... this goes to show the imperfectness of "relevant market" as a conceptual
tool to determine market power. It is a blunt instmment. But because it seemed
infeasible to use anything but gross countywide market shares in the Von's case,
that was what they used.
E-mail from Richard Stern to author (Aug. 4, 2000)(on file with author).
17 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. For an excellent analysis of the incipiency
concept in the closely related contexts of the FTC Act and FTC Act cases, see Neil W.
Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REv. 227, 242-51 (1981). The relevant FTC Act legislative history
and cases' incipiency language also is unclear, however, so it is uncertain precisely what
the doctrine means in an FTC Act context. See id. at 242-27.
18 See 15 U.S.C. § 2.
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ment to be tough enough. 19 It enacted the antimerger laws to prevent
even relatively small "lessen [ings]" of competition, decreases that only
"tend" to create a monopoly, even if these mergers would not violate
the Sherman Act. 20
The structural thresholds in the current Merger Guidelines 21 reflect
this concern, at least to a degree. For example, the Guidelines contain
a presumption that market power will be created or enhanced whenever
a merger increases concentration by an HHI of more than 100 to a level
in excess of 1800. 22 Although these are not Von's Grocery's numbers,
neither would mergers slightly in excess of these thresholds violate the
Sherman ACt. 23 Whether the thresholds in the Guidelines and the actual
stringency of enforcement fully reflect the Congressional incipiency
concern is, of course, a matter of opinion.24
2. The merger under review should be blocked because it could cause an industry
trend or wave toward mergers. Even if the transaction under review would not
Uy itself create competitive harm, if such transactions were permitted, the cumulative effects of a number of similar transactions could harm competition. In

other words, a merger should be blocked whenever anticompetitive harm
would be likely to result from several more-or-less-identical mergers that
would be reasonably likely to arise if the first merger were permitted. 25
In part to prevent a race to merge before the industry becomes unduly
concentrated, even otherwise innocuous mergers should be blocked at
the start of the merger wave. 26
Although it is difficult to determine when a trend or wave is likely to
start or continue, at some point-perhaps not until the second or third
19

See Lande, supra note 5, at 128, 136.

2°Id. It is difficult to ascertain the cumulative meaning of the modifiers of the "lessen"

standard: the "may" and the "substantially" requirements. See the discussion of the "may"
language in terms of a lower required probability of anticompetitive behavior, supra
Part 11(4).
21 U.S. Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) "jJ13,104.
22 See id., § 1.51, at 20,569-63. This presumption can, of course, be overcome.
25 See, e.g., the cases cited infra note 35.
24 To the extent the enforcers use significantly higher thresholds in practice, their
enforcement would not embody the incipiency concept. See infra note 54.
25 It is possible that a merger could cause other firms to merge, out of a fear that the
first merger would place them at a competitive disadvantage. A single merger could even
cause an entire industry to consolidate. This undue consolidation could come quickly,
from a sudden wave, or slowly, from a gradual industry trend. These mergers could be
within the same industry, or in an upstream or downstream market.
26 Of course, a merger trend within an industry could be caused by procompetitive
reasons, and this possibility also would have to be considered by the enforcers.
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similar merger27-the trend or wave should be recognized and halted.
A merger may spark a trend for many reasons, including the "lemming"
or "copycat" effect. 28 For example, soon after Pepsi announced that it
wanted to acquire Seven-Up, Coca-Cola announced that it would purchase Dr Pepper. 29 Coke's announcement was widely seen as a tactical
move, one caused by Pepsi's announcement. One possible outcome
would have been for both mergers to be approved, thus increasing CocaCola's market strength. 30 Alternatively, both mergers could have been
turned down, thus preventing Pepsi from roughly catching up to CocaCola in terms of market position. 3l In either event, Coca-Cola would
come out ahead relative to not attempting its own merger. 32
27 One could also ask why the first of several similar mergers should be permitted even
though the subsequent ones should be blocked. This policy could create a perverse
industry-wide incentive: If firms believe that a merger trend might start, they might decide
to merge as quickly as possible to escape the incipiency doctrine. Thus, the absence of
an incipiency doctrine could encourage ill-considered and inefficient mergers.
The firms could even be in a "prisoners' dilemma." They might all be better off if none
merged. If any two merged, however, they might all be forced to merge by competitive
pressures and/or network effects. Since the last mergers might well be blocked, each firm
could have an incentive to be one of the first to merge.
28 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 600. The authors state:
A rival may think or fear that the merger will create efficiencies ... [or] perceive
the merger as giving strategic (perhaps anticompetitive) advantages to the merged
firms ... [or the CEO] may simply not know what the effects of the merger may
be, but desire to copy the merger lest the board of directors ask why the CEO
is not in-line with the industry trend.
Id. A wave of mergers may also be generated by a fear of not having a suitable choice of
partners, or a fear that the antitrust door could close after the market becomes too
concentrated. Further, some investment counselors advise buying stock only in the leading
firms in an industry, so a firm might want to merge to increase shareholder value.
Recently there was a prominent case that might qualifY as an example. Mter the AOL/
Time Warner merger was announced, there was intense speculation that if this merger
were permitted it would lead to other large media mergers. See Hearing on the America
Online/Time Warner Merger Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate (statement of Robert H. Lande, Mar. 2, 2000). This testimony was delivered on behalf
of the American Antitrust Institute and is available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
recent/59.cfm.
29 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 600.
30 Coca-Cola later admitted that there was an internal memo suggesting that Coke make
a bid for Dr Pepper in part to thwart the Pepsi/Seven-Up merger. See Dave Skidmore,
Federal Judge Blocks Coca-Cola-Dr Pepper Merger, AsSOCIATED PRESS, July 31, 1986, available
at 1986 WL 3065832; Andy Pasztur & Timothy Smith, Coke Launched Dr Pepper Bid to Scuttle
Plans IJy PepsiCo., Documents Indicate, WALL ST.j.,July 29, 1986, available at 1986 WL 253211.
31 Both mergers were challenged and eventually were abandoned or blocked. See FTC
v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986).
32 "Coca-Cola Co. had been expanding without acquisition, but when PepsiCo., its principal competitor, sought to make a major acquisition of 7-Up Co., Coke apparently felt it
should have the same privilege, if the rules permitted." Id. at 1131.
Another possible example is seen in FTC v. Cardinal Health Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C.
1998). This case involved two drug wholesalers, each of which wanted to purchase another

2001]

RESURRECTING INCIPIENCY

881

3. Since errors of both over-enforcement and under-enforcement are inevitable,
merger enforcement should err on the side of over-enforcement. Under this defini-

tion, the Clayton Act should be thought of in terms of Type I and Type
II error, and the incipiency mandate means that decisionmakers should
err more on the side of making Type I errors. 33 One justification for
this approach to the incipiency doctrine is that the risks of over-enforcement are likely to be lower in the merger context than for Sherman Act
violations, where criminal penalties, treble damages, and the break-up
of an ongoing company is possible. 34 Because of these severe penalties,
a Sherman Act violation should only be found under relatively unusual
circumstances. Since merger actions today involve only injunctions, however, the risk of over-enforcement is not so undesirable. Moreover,
because market forces will tend to correct over-enforcement errors by,
for example, causing any efficiencies that might have been obtained
from the merger instead to be achieved through contracts or in other
ways, merger injunctions should be granted relatively freely.
4. A lower probability of harm will suffice for a violation of the Clayton Act
than that required for a violation of the Sherman Act. All antitrust decisions

are predictions made with uncertain probabilities. The Sherman Act
blocks mergers likely to lead to monopoly power or the dangerous probadrug wholesaler. Cardinal Health announced a merger with Bergen, and merger discussions between McKesson and AmeriSource "quickly ensued." Id. at 43-44. Although McKesson officials insisted its merger was unrelated to Cardinal's, commentators opined that
the two were linked, and that the company wanted the FTC to view the mergers together.
See, e.g., Chris Serb, Big . .. Bigger . .. Biggest: McKesson~' Play Clouds Chances that the FTC
Will OK Two Major Deals, HOSPITALS & HEALTH NETWORKS, Dec. 5, 1997, at 46, available
at 1997 WL 9576661; McKesson/AmeriSource Merger Would Create Company with 38% Market
Share,THE GREEN SHEET, Sept. 29, 1997, available at 1997 WL 18975239.
If Cardinal and Bergen were allowed to merge, McKesson would have lost its number
one spot in the industry. See Serb, supra; TH~: GREEN SHEET, supra. McKesson's merger
was announced so soon after Cardinal's that it appears likely that the FTC would have
allowed both mergers to proceed or disallowed both; but either way, McKesson would
have remained on top. See Serb, supra; THE GR~:EN SHEET, supra; FrC Wants More Merger
Detail from Bergen Brnnswig Pharmaceuticals: Sale of Orange Firm to Cardinal Health Raises
Antitrust Concerns, LA TIMES, Sept. 27, 1997, at 01, available at 1997 WL 8271877; Waving
a Red Flag Before Regulators, Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 1997, at 54, available at 1997 WL 8271877.
McKesson's tactic has been labeled as similar to Coca-Cola's announcement to acquire
Dr Pepper. See Nikhil Deogun & Robert Guy Matthews, Alcan Leaves Door Open to Reynolds
Bid, WALL ST. j., Aug. 13, 1999, at A3, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5464410. The FTC did
consider the Cardinal/Bergen and McKesson/ AmeriSource mergers together, and both
were blocked. See Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 34.
gg See Lande, supra note 5, at 134-35. For a discussion of Type I (stopping beneficial
mergers) and II (allowing undesirable mergers) errors in a merger enforcement context,
see Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 7 I CAL.
L. REv. 1580, 1670-77 (1983). In addition, Type III error, which includes enforcement, cost,
and effects on business certainty, should also be considered. See id.
34 Minimizing Type II error would be the incipiency doctrine; minimizing Type I error
would be Chicago-school antimerger enforcement.
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bility of monopoly power, and is a mixed civil/criminal statute. 35 The
Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act, by contrast, is designed
to block mergers the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen
competition or to tend to create a monopoly."36 Incipiency could be
defined through a stress on the "may" language, in contrast to the
Sherman Act requirement of a likely "monopoly" or the "dangerous
probability" of one. Relatively greater uncertainty about whether the
merger is likely to be anticompetitive will still lead to a Clayton Act
violation. 37
One practical way to implement the probability orientation of the
doctrine, as well as the error issue contained in the previous definition,
would be to have especially strict enforcement for the largest mergers
in the most highly concentrated industries. For these mergers there
would be an unduly large probability that erroneously allowing the
merger would adversely affect competition and consumerwelfare. 38 Alternatively, either Philadelphia National Bank's presumption that these mergers were anticompetitive 39 or a "sliding scale" approach that was toughest
on the very largest mergers could be a way to implement this version of
the incipiency concept. 40
5. The Clayton Act should look further into the future for possible harm. In
contrast to thinking of incipiency in terms of cumulative effects, trends,
amount of harm, probability of harm, or errors, this definition is temporal in nature. Instead of worrying about present harm, it looks to the
future and hypothesizes more broadly about the eventual impact of a
merger. Suppose, for example, that merging firms do not make any
products that currently compete with one another, and that they are
each the dominant producer of related products. Suppose also that the
35 See id.; see also, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
222 (1993) (interpreting the Sherman Act to "condemn predatory pricing when it poses
'a dangerous probability of actual monopolization'" (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993)); Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 459 (holding that
a company may not be liable for attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act absent proof of a dangerous probability of monopolization).
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 18.
37 By contrast, if we require virtual certainty that a merger will lead to anticompetitive
effects, very few mergers would be blocked.
38 This assumes that there is a correlation between concentration and either profit or
price. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 61-67 and 12l.
39 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 362, 363 (1963).
40 All guidelines numbers embody predictions. The Merger Guidelines could, in effect,
contain a prediction that we are more confident that an HHI increase of 400 in a highly
concentrated market will increase market power than we are that an HHI increase of 100
will do so.
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enforcers and court believe it is likely that these related products will
converge and compete with each other in three to six years. This prediction would, of course, have to be based upon reasonably reliable evidence. Nevertheless, such a merger could be enjoined under the
incipiency doctrine. 41 It is possible that this meaning of incipiency is
used today, except that it is termed a concern with innovation markets. 42
Congress and the Supreme Court have never clarified which of these
five possible meanings were intended, or whether they were all desired. 43
Moreover, the definitions overlap and reinforce one another. Nevertheless, it is clear that they feared significantly increasing industry-wide
concentration and wanted very strict antimerger enforcement. In Von's
Grocery, for example, the Court seemed concerned that the number of
firms in the market had diminished from 5,365 in 1950 to 3,818 in 1961.44
But why, exactly, was increasing concentration within industries so bad?
Part of the Court's concern appeared to be with the disappearance of
small businesses as an end in itself. 45 A concern with the disappearance
of small businesses should, however, be distinguished from a fear of rising
concentration. Mergers of small businesses rarely raise concentration as
much as do the mergers of medium and large businesses. Perhaps for this
reason the disappearance of small businesses is now largely recognized
as a social concern irrelevant to antitrust analysis. For example, the
defendants in Von's Grocery were chains ranked number three and six in
the Los Angeles metropolitan area. 46 While they certainly were not Fortune 500 companies, neither were they "Ma and Pa" corner grocery
stores. The merger of two "Ma and Pa" corner grocery stores into a tiny
chain would indeed represent the loss of a small business. But its effect
on the overall concentration of the Los Angeles grocery market, and on
competition within this market, would be infinitesimally small.
Only in Philadelphia National Bank did the Court give reasons why it
feared the ultimate harms that could come from incipient harms to
This assumes the existence of barriers to entry, etc.
Whether innovation markets are actually used today, or whether the enforcers and
the courts are really concerned with future goods markets, is controversial. See the excellent
and provocative discussion in Lawrence B. Landman, Competitiveness, Innovation Policy, and
the Innovation Market Myth: A Reply to Tom and Newberg on Innovation Markets as the "Centerpiece"
of "New Thinking" on Innovation, 13 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COM. 223 (1998). The rationale behind
blocking these mergers could also be framed in terms of the potential competition doctrine.
43 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
44 See Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 273.
45 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962). See also Lande,
supra note 5, at 139-40, for an analysis of the Act's legislative history on this point.
46 See Von s Grocery, 384 U.S. at 272.
41

42
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competition. The Court discussed the anticompetitive effects of undue
concentration and the reason why it created a presumption that unduly
large mergers were anticompetitive 47 in terms that resonate into the 21st
century.48 The Court expressed a concern with possible adverse effects
of the merger on "price, variety of credit arrangements, convenience
of location, attractiveness of physical surroundings, credit information,
investment advice, service charges, personal accommodations, advertising, miscellaneous special and extra services .... "49 The Court thus
explained its fear of undue concentration in terms of a reduction in
either price or nonprice competition that might harm consumers.50 The
Court wanted consumers to be able to choose freely on the basis of any
price or non price issue important to them. The Court feared that a
merger might lead to an "incipient" reduction of some aspect of consumer choice. 51
In sum, the meaning of the incipiency doctrine is uncertain. It is
clear that Congress favored strict merger enforcement and feared trends
towards concentration. We also know that the incipiency idea called for
a variety of types of predictions, and that its ultimate objective was to
preserve a competitive level of consumer choice (i.e., to preserve both
price and non price competition). The early cases that established the
doctrine, moreover, have never been overruled. The incipiency doctrine
cannot, however, be defined more precisely than this.
III. THE DECLINE OF THE INCIPIENCY DOCTRINE
All of the doctrine's definitions call for strict merger enforcement,
but merger enforcement started to loosen soon after Philadelphia National
Bank. The 1968 Merger Guidelines's52 numerical thresholds were significantly higher than those suggested by Von's Grocery.53 The 1982 Merger
Guidelines contained still higher numerical thresholds, in many other
respects loosened enforcement,54 and omitted all concern with the trend-

See Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
Id. at 362-70.
49 See id. at 368.
50 See id. at 364.
51 See also cases cited infra note 94.
52 U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines §§ 5 & 6 (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,10l.
53 See Paul Pautler, A Review of the Economic Basis for Broad-Based Horizontal Merger Policy,
28 ANTITRUST BULL. 571 (1983).
54 See id.; Thomas Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan
Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 211 (1988).
47
48
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to-concentration issue and many other possible definitions of incipiency.
Merger enforcement during the Reagan Administration showed even
greater tolerance towards mergers, and completely ignored the incipiency doctrine. 55 For example, although the 1982 Merger Guidelines
provided a safe harbor for post-merger HHIs of less than 1000 and stated
that a challenge was "likely" if the merger would have increased the HHI
by more than 100 to a post-merger level in excess of 1800,56 during much
of the Reagan Administration mergers rarely were challenged unless
they would have increased the HHI by at least 250 to a level of at least
1800.51 In actual practice, there was roughly a "[d]e facto doubling of
the HHI standards. "58 Not surprisingly, the number of merger challenges
declined significantly during this period. 59 The fate of the incipiency
doctrine can also be documented by noting the sharp decline in the
number of times that the words "incipiency" and "trend to[wards] concentration" have been used in merger decisions since Brown Shoe. 60 There
are several reasons for the doctrine's decline.
55

See id. at 226-27.

See U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines § III A 1 a, c (1982), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,102. The 1984 Guidelines, however, softened this language,
and only stated that such mergers very likely to create or enhance market power-an
effective further loosening of the Guidelines' standards. See U.S. Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines § 1 & n.4 (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,103.
57 See Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note 54, at 227. Similarly, Malcolm Coate notes:
"[During] the Bush Administration, the weight of the evidence suggests that the FfC was
likely to bring cases if the HHI exceeded 2400 with a change of 500-[and] [e]nforcement
decisions were rare if the post merger HHI was less than 1800 or the change was less
than 200 ... » Malcolm B. Coate, Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission in Three
Presidential Administrations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 323, 335-36 (2000).
58 See Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note 54, at 228.
59 See id. at 226-28.
60 See chart, formulated by Westlaw searches in the Supreme Court (SCT) , Federal Courts
of Appeals (CTA), and Federal District Court (DCT) databases: merger & incipiency &
da [aft 06/25/1962]; merger & trend/s concentrat! & da[aft 06/25/1962]; merger/s wave
& da[aft 06/25/1962].
12
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First, due to advances in economic learning, the consensus in the
antitrust field over the deleterious effects of high industry concentration
changed. The field has become less certain that there is a significant
and valid correlation between concentration and profitability.61 The field
also has become less certain whether there is a correlation between
concentration and price. 62 Even many who believed that higher concentration often leads to higher prices often find these effects to be small,63
and believe that the correlation between concentration and price only
manifests itself at relatively high levels of concentration. 64 Although
respected scholars continue to believe that higher concentration often
leads to higher prices and profits,65 and the debate rages on,66 at a
minimum, it is safe to conclude that today fewer members of the antitrust
community believe strongly in the structure-conduct-performance
hypothesis. Under this relatively skeptical view of the anticompetitive
effects of concentration, the HHI levels in the current Merger Guidelines
can be viewed as embodying the incipiency doctrine. 67
A second change has been the increasing recognition that mergers
often lead to significant efficiencies. 68 During the period when efficiencies from mergers were viewed as rare and possibly even undesirable,
nothing was lost from a strong incipiency doctrine. 69 However, as the
profession increasingly came to appreciate that these efficiencies were
common, significant, and desirable, the incipiency doctrine lost its

61 See Barry C. Harris & David D. Smith, The Merger Guidelines v. Economics: A Suroey of
Economic Studies, ANTITRUST REp., Sept. 1999, at 23, 35-36. Richard Schmalensee, InterIndustry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951, 976 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) ("The relation, if
any, between seller concentration and profitability is weak statistically, and the estimated
concentration effect is usually small. The estimated relation is unstable over time and
space and vanishes in many multivariate studies."). See also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 411 (3d ed. 1990). But
see the material cited infra notes 66 and 121.
62 Harris & Smith, supra note 61, at 36-37.
63 See id. at 36-37, 43.
64 See id. at 42.
65 See id. at 42-43.
66 See id.; see also FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF REpORT, TRANSFORMATION AND
CONTINUITY: THE U.S. CARBONATED SOFT DRINK BOTTLING INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST
POLICY SINCE 1980 (Nov. 1999) (concluding on page viii that "Horizontal franchise acquisitions by Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola bottlers led to ... prices that were 3.5%-12.8% higher
than otherwise); infra note 121.
67 See the discussion in SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 60l.
68 See Fisher & Lande, supra note 33.
69 See id. at 1582 n.4 & 5, 1599-624.
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attraction and even became viewed as counterproductive. 70 Moreover,
there are two general methods that can be used in attempts to capture
efficiencies from mergers. The first, a case-by-case approach, would
implement an explicit efficiencies defense. The second approach would
be to obtain efficiencies on average by raising the effective safe harbors
in the Guidelines.1 1 The latter method is the equivalent of ratcheting
back the incipiency doctrine. 72
A third change-increasingly skeptical decisionmakers-was especially
true during the Reagan Administration. 73 For example, a Reagan-era
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, J. Paul McGrath, announced
that he was challenging mergers under a Sherman Act standard. 74 His
successor, Douglas Ginsburg, believed that enforcers should evaluate
mergers under a "criminal law standard" and presumably not challenge
mergers unless they were sure, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
merger would be anticompetitive. 75 Conservative enforcers also may have
had less faith in the ability of the government to accurately predict future
anticompetitive outcomes in a market, and more faith in the market's
ability to self-correct. 76
The Reagan era also brought in an increasingly conservative judiciary77
that promulgated a series of decisions that discouraged strict enforcement. For example, the courts held that mergers should not be blocked
where entry is relatively quick and easy, where the exercise of market
70 For example, a trend towards concentration in an industry might reflect technological
change, reduced demand, or an innocuous industry realignment.
71 Id. at 1651-77.
72 The optimal strictness of merger enforcement can be expressed in terms of a balancing
of efficiency against harmful price and nonprice effects. To the extent mergers often
cause significant efficiencies, merger enforcement should be more permissive. To the
extent mergers cause anticompetitive effects, enforcement should be more stringent. This
article will not discuss the optimal balance. For many of the relevant considerations, see
Fisher & Lande, supra note 33.
73 See Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note 54.
74 See Neil Henderson, Baldrige Merger Plan Criticil£d Changes in Law Called Unnecessary,
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1985, at Fl, available at 1985 WL 2130025.
75 See Douglas Ginsburg, The Appropriate Role of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies, 9 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1277, 1283 (1988).
76 See, e.g., 1992 Guidelines, supra note 21, § 2.1.
77 See, e.g., David Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
Preemption jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1166-67 (1999)
(noting there is a predominance of Republican judges in the federal judiciary); Michael
H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of justice
Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 369, 395 n.87 (1999) (recognizing a "long stretch
of Republican appointments to the federal bench during the 1980's and early 1990's")
(citations omitted).
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power would be checked due to presence of powerful buyers, and where
high market shares do not accurately predict the merger's potential for
harm.78 During this period the courts eroded and limited the application
of the Philadelphia National Bank presumption that mergers leading to
extremely large market share are anticompetitive. An opinion by (then)
Judge Clarence Thomas even appears to have taken the position that
the presumption has been completely abolished. 79

In sum, regardless of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act,
courts are reluctant to implement any version of the incipiency doctrine
to the extent that largely conservative judges and justices believe that
its intellectual foundations have eroded. While the concept has never
explicitly been overruled in any decision, the courts and enforcers have
usually ignored it in recent years. Not surprisingly, even though every
possible definition of the doctrine calls for very aggressive enforcement,
this strictness has to a large extent disappeared from merger analysis.
IV. DISTILLING INCIPIENCY TO ITS GOAL:
CONSUMER CHOICE
There is no logical basis for a return to merger enforcement as strict
as the approach in Von's Gocery.80 Nevertheless, merger enforcement today
is significantly more aggressive than during the Reagan Administration. 8l
78

For a discussion of the relevant cases, see Robert H. Lande &James Langenfeld, From

Surrogates to Stories: The Evolution oj Federal Merger Policy, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 5.
79 See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1990), affd, 90S F.2d

9S1 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
80 An interesting example of this evolution in thinking is that of Judge Posner. He
argued Von's Grocery while a member of the Solicitor General's office, and "was perfectly
convinced of the soundness of the government's position." Kathleen E. McDermott, Whatever Happened To . .. Von's?, ANTITRUST, Summer 1993, at 46, 46. He subsequently came
to believe that the merger in question "was completely harmless." Id.
81 Perhaps surprisingly, much of the increase in aggressiveness may have taken place
during the Bush Administration. For example, Malcolm Coate shows that "[aJfter an
increase from the low levels of the mid] 9S0s, FTC enforcement, as a share of reportable
transactions, has remained relatively constant from the late 19S0s through 1996." Coate,
supra note 57, at 347. To the extent this is true, the failure of the current administration
to be even more aggressive than it has been might be explained by the tightly restricted
FTC budget, despite a huge merger wave during recent years, and the fact that the
enforcers have had to try their cases in front of a judiciary largely appointed by Republicans.
See Spence & Murray, supra note 75, at ] ]66-167; Koby, supra note 77, at 395 n.S7
(citations omitted).
Alternatively, perhaps the Clinton Administration has been more aggressive, but this
aggressiveness largely has come in the form of markets that are more tightly defined and
other changes that less readily lend themselves to quantification. For example, the relevant
market in FrC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997), might not have been
defined so narrowly if that case had arisen during the Bush Administration. Alternatively,
the Clinton Administration enforcers might have allocated a larger percentage of their
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There have certainly been notably vigorous merger enforcement actions
during the Clinton Administration, such as the Staples/Office Depot 82 and
BP/ARC083 challenges. Moreover, the FTC announced a consent in the
BP/Amoco merger84 that seemed designed to convey the message that the
agency was concerned with anticompetitive effects even in markets that
were only moderately concentrated. 85 FTC Chair Robert Pitofsky even
cited Brown Shoe for its holding that the enforcers are supposed to consider whether the merger at issue could help cause a merger wave. 86
Nevertheless, the current federal Merger Guidelines do not contain a
concern that a merger might lead to other mergers in the same or related
industries, or several of the other forms of the incipiency doctrine that
were discussed in Part II, above. 87
very scarce resources to nonmerger cases, such as Microsoft, Visa/MasterCard, Tays "R" Us,
and Intel.
82 See ITC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
83 See ITC v. BP Amoco and ARCO, ITC File No. 9910192 (Feb. 4, 2000).
84 See Mary Lou Steptoe &Jamie Towey, Recent Trends in Federal Merger Enforcement:
The Return of Coordinated Effects Analysis, Speech Before ABA Seminar on Advanced
Mergers and Acquisitions Counseling Workshop (June 10, 1999) (analyzing In re British
Petroleum Co. (BP) & Amoco Corp., Agreement Containing Consent Order, ITC File No.
981-0345 (Dec. 30,1998); Decision and Order, ITC Docket. No. C-3868 (Apr. 19, 1999)).
85 The BP / Amoco complaint alleged: "The wholesale sale of gasoline in each market
would be moderately concentrated or highly concentrated after the merger. In markets
that would be moderately concentrated after the merger, postmerger concentration, as
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, would increase by more than 100 points
to levels between 1,400 and 1,800." BP & Amoco Corp., ITC File No. 981-0354, Complaint
~ 16. "Pre merger concentration in the terminaling markets, as measured by the HerfindahlHirschman Index, ranges from more than 1,300 to more than 2,500, and as a result of
the merger concentration would increase in each terminal by more than 100 points to
levels ranging from more than 1,500 to more than 3,600." Id. ~ 14. For other examples
and analysis, see Steptoe & Towey, supra note 84, at 26-33.
However, it should be emphasized that this administrations's renewed aggressiveness
largely has been untested in the courts. Parties often settle cases even if there would be
a good chance that ultimately they would prevail in court.
86 See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, The Nature and Limits of
Restructuring in Merger Review, Remarks at the Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference (Feb.
17, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm. Chairman
Pitofsky stated:
[A) decision not to challenge a particular transaction may initiate a trend towards
similar transactions in the same industry .... The legislative history of Section 7
of the Clayton Act makes clear that the responsibilities of enforcement officials
and courts if to weigh not only the anti-competitive effects of the particular deal
at issue, but also the possibility that the transaction is part of a merger wave. See
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332-34. Our responsibility is not just to examine the
merits of a particular transaction, but to take account where the industry, as a
result of similar transactions, might be going.
Id. at 6-7. But see infra note 115 for remarks by Chairman Pitofsky with a different tone.
87 The Guidelines omit any explicit concern that a merger might spark similar mergers,
a merger wave, or an industry trend towards consolidation. See 1992 Guidelines, supra note
21, § 1.52. While the Guidelines do not explicitly rule out consideration of these factors,
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During the Reagan Administration enforcers believed that the only
legitimate goal of merger policy (and other areas of antitrust) was to
promote economic efficiency.88 This view has long been criticized because
Congress wanted to prevent prices from rising (it did not just want to
preven t overall efficiency from decreasing). 89 Although the two standards
are similar, a price standard for merger enforcement should yield more
challenges than an approach based solely upon efficiency.9o Mergers
leading to higher consumer prices could be permitted under an efficiency approach if they led to significant cost savings. But under a price
approach, any merger leading to higher prices should be blocked. 91 The
renewed vigor of current enforcement may in part reflect the enforcers'
use of a price, as opposed to efficiency, standard. Despite this renewed
vigor, a consumer choice-centered approach to antitrust could cause
merger enforcement to become even more robust.
A consumer choice approach to antitrust arises from the observation
that if one examines every type of antitrust violation, from price fixing
to predation, and asks what they have in common, the answer is they all
significantly restrict consumer choice. 92 Antitrust violations all significantly and artificially restrict, distort, or diminish the options that otherwise would be offered by the free market. Consumers are entitled to
choose from an array of prices, qualities, varieties, and safety levels that
are set by market forces. Consumers are not entitled to any particular
level of choices, and more choices are not always desirable. 93 Rather,
practices that significantly interfere with the options that the free market
otherwise would provide to consumers are termed antitrust violations.
A number of Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that under
the antitrust laws, consumer welfare consists of much more than low
prices. 94 The purpose of the antitrust laws is to give consumers the ability
perhaps they do so implicitly since they embody a healthy skepticism of the ability of the
enforcers to "[predictllikely future behavior based on the types of incomplete and sometimes contradictory information typically generated in merger investigations." [d. § 2.1.
88 See Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency As the Ruler of Antitrust, 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 438, 444 (1988).
89 See, e.g., Alan A. Fisher, Frederick LJohnson & Robert H. Lande, PriceE.1/ects of Horizontal
Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777 (1989).
90 See id. at 794-809.
91 See id.
92 See Averitt & Lande articles, infra note 95.
93 See id.
94 See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) ("an agreement
limiting consumer choice ... cannot be sustained"); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 n.5 (1988) (determining that the challenged activity
"might deprive some consumers of a desired product"); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 370 n.20 (1977) ("The public is entitled to know the ... useful information that will
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to choose freely from among the price and nonprice options that the
free market would provide to them. 95 Consumers are entitled, as a matter
of the economic property rights given to citizens in our capitalist economy, to the array of options that otherwise would result from the unhindered operation of the free market. 96
A consumer choice-centered approach could be used independently
of any of the meanings of the incipiency doctrine presented in Part II,
but could also be used as the foundation for returning to some version
of the incipiency concept. A consumer choice approach could embody
the enforcers' and courts' decision to revive the ultimate goal of the
incipiency doctrine-the legislative desire to preserve the market's competitive offerings for consumers.97 In this way the intellectual underpinning of the incipiency doctrine could survive, even though its 1960sstyle implementation would not.
Since the term "incipiency" was never defined precisely, it is difficult
to determine whether consumer choice goals are a central part of it. At
a minimum, however, it fairly can be concluded that consumer choice
constitutes the intellectual foundation and ultimate goal of the incipiency
enable people to make a more informed choice"); United States v. Continental Can Co.,
379 U.S. 441, 455 (1964) ("price is only one factor in a user's choice"). Many lower court
cases also make this point. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 676 (3d Cir.
1993) (labeling the crucial issue as whether the challenged practice "actually enhances
consumer choice"); Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak, 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979) (labeling
the crucial issue as whether "the free choice of consumers is preserved"); Butler Aviation
Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 389 F.2d 517, 520 (2d Cir.1968) (analyzing effect of corporate
acquisition on consumer choice).
95 For a more thorough discussion, see Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer
Choice: The Practical Reason fOT Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 Loy. CONSUMER
L. REp. 44 (1998); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory
of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST LJ. 713 (1997).
96 For some of the differences between the choice and efficiency approaches to antitrust,
see supra note 3. Perhaps the main difference is one of degree. Although efficiency analysis
in theory accounts for non price aspects of consumer preferences, as a practical matter
these attributes are often ignored, in large part because their measurement is so difficult.
Of course, sometimes economists are able to measure the value of a new product or
service and the value of non price attributes of products and services as well. Moreover,
their ability to perform the necessary measurements has improved significantly in recent
years. For an excellent survey of the relevant literature, see Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 AM. L. & ECON.
REv. 386, 421-24 (1999) (analyzing new measurement and evaluation techniques and
concluding with respect to one technique that "[tlhe promise of this new empirical
approach is that it will permit the analyst to characterize demand by allowing preferences
to vary across buyers in an unrestricted way, potentially providing a richer description of
the bases of consumer choice-[however,l the approach has not yet (to our knowledge)
been applied in practice by the enforcement agencies in situations in which data sources
are often limited along with the available time for discovery and analysis.")
97 See supra Part II.
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doctrine. Moreover, if interpreted broadly, the incipiency doctrine can
be generalized to a desire for strict enforcement. Under this very general
definition the consumer choice concern certainly should be considered
a part of it.
V. THE CHOICE APPROACH TO MERGER ENFORCEMENT
As the Court observed in Philadelphia National Bank, consumers desire
much more from antimerger enforcement than competitive prices. 98
Antitrust at its most fundamental level is about choice-about giving
consumers a competitive range of options in the marketplace so consumers can make their own, effective selection from the market's offerings. 99

The "choice" and "price" approaches to merger enforcement are usually similar. If a market offers competitive prices, its firms usually will
offer a competitive array of nonprice choices.lOo Nevertheless, there are
two types of situations where nonprice or consumer choice results of
mergers should be focused upon separately.
The first involves equilibria that are noncompetitive due to the presence of collusion. In these situations, choice should be factored into the
rule of reason along with price and efficiency effects. Consider cases
like Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 101 Indiana Federation of Dentists v. FTC, 102
Detroit Auto Dealers Association,103 National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,I04 and California Dental Association v. FTC. 105 Each involved

higher prices and diminished consumer choice. l06 To the extent each
98
99

See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95.

100 If a market is price-competitive but consumers want a wider range of models or
options, the competing manufacturers normally will extend their product lines. Soft drink
consumers who want orange soda will get it, and it does not matter whether orange soda
is made by a firm that also makes colas, or even by an orange juice or beer company. No
harm, no foul. A series of mergers that would leave only a handful of significant beverage
manufacturers might well not offend the antitrust laws.
This is, of course, a greatly oversimplified analysis. The antimerger statute is worded in
terms of preventing mergers the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition
or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18. To perform the analysis correctly,
many factors would have to be examined, including the relevant market shares, industry
concentration trends, and barriers to entry.
101 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
102 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
103 III F.T.C. 417 (1989), affd in part and rev'd in part, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992).
104 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
105 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
106 For an analysis of each case, see Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three
Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules (unpublished draft, Aug. 24, 2000)
(on file with the author).
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involved efficiencies, the harm to consumer choice should be added to
the price effects and weighed against these efficiencies. An analysis that
left out the effects of the activity in question on non price competition
would be incomplete. 107
Second, there are situations where a market is price-competitive and
firms compete vigorously on non price terms, but where a competitive
range of non price options can exist only if they are provided from
organizationally separate entities. lo8 This is likely to be significant in fields
where innovation, creativity, and objectivity are especially important. For
example, communications media compete in part by offering independent editorial viewpoints and an independent gatekeeper function. Five
media firms may not be able effectively to respond to a demand for
choice or diversity competition by extending their product lines because
the new media products will inevitably bear, to some degree, the perspective of their common corporate parent. 109 For these reasons, competition
in terms of editorial viewpoint or gatekeeping can be guaranteed only
by ensuring that a media market contains a larger number of firms than
may be required in other, more conventional markets. The number of
media firms (or firms certain other fields, such as fashion or entertainment) necessary to ensure effective variety, diversity, or choice competition may be significantly larger than that required to preserve price
competition. I 10
Part III showed how the strength of the antitrust field's belief about
the anticompetitive effects of high concentration has eroded over time.
\07 The harm to consumer welfare from artificially low consumer choice (i.e., consumers
whose search costs were raised who might not find the product that was optimal for them)
is a deadweight loss, not a transfer captured by the colluders.
\08 See Averitt & Lande articles, supra note 95.
109 An important but subsidiary question is, "Who is the real or effective gatekeeper"
concerning particular issues? Even an independently owned newspaper has several potential gatekeepers or viewpoint promulgators-its writers, editors, and publisher. A large
conglomerate like AOL/Time Warner would have its CEO as its ultimate gatekeeper. On
particular issues, different people within the organization would, as a practical matter,
have gatekeeping or viewpoint functions. Nevertheless, suppose that the CEO of AOL/
Time Warner instructed the editors-in-chief of all of its publications to endorse the
same candidate. This could have frightening consequences for our country. Despite this
possibility of decentralized decision making, for merger evaluation purposes there should
be a presumption that a media firm's CEO is the gatekeeper for every part of that firm.
110 This interpretation of the antitrust laws is, moreover, consistent with fundamental
First Amendment principles. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that free speech requires variety of opinion and that,
"the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. .. "); 4
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 20.6,
20.20 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the purposes of the First Amendment and the First
Amendment's interaction with antitrust law).
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However, the studies that caused this erosion measured price or profit,
not choice.lll To my knowledge, there has not been serious empirical
work showing the extent to which higher concentration leads to diminished consumer choice, how significant this diminution might be, or
which concentration levels might lead to this decrease. Much work in
this area remains to be done.
Today a consumer choice approach constitutes only a modest part of
merger enforcement. The federal Merger Guidelines, for example, have
a section titled "Purpose and Underlying Policy Assumptions of the
Guidelines,"112 which contains roughly a dozen references in the text to
"price," the "transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers," and similar monetary concepts. ll3 Only a single footnote suggests that merger policy
includes non-monetary concerns.1l4 Thus, while the Guidelines permit
consideration of non price aspects of consumer choice, the Guidelines
are structured in such a way as not to particularly encourage this exercise.
A choice-based approach to mergers might well lead decisionmakers
to block significantly more mergers than enforcement based solely upon
price or efficiency. Since this largely constitutes untested territory, however, it is impossible to predict the extent to which it could revitalize
merger enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is said that a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.
Unfortunately, if that first step is in the wrong direction, the journey
can be a misguided one. If its original goal was a worthy one, the journey
should not be abandoned, however, even though a major correction will
be needed. Perhaps this will turn out to be the story of the incipiency doctrine.

The doctrine originated as part of a sound Congressional directive
that the enforcers and courts prevent mergers reasonably likely to lessen
consumer choice. Unfortunately, the misguided Von's Grocery doctrine
brought the merger incipiency doctrine into disrepute. Although cases
like Staples/Office Depot demonstrate that merger enforcement has
become significantly more aggressive in recent years, for a number of
reasons the enforcers and the courts have been reluctant to implement
See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
See Part 0.1; 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 'l! 13,104, at 20,569-63.
113Id. at 20,569-63 to 20,571.
114 Footnote 6 of the 1992 Merger Guidelines reads, "Sellers with market power may
lessen competition on dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service, or
innovation." [d. at 20,571.
111

112
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the incipiency doctrine even more vigorously,ll5 despite the Congressional mandate that they do SO.1I6
A renewed incipiency doctrine would involve making predictions, and
these predictions would have to be based upon reasonably reliable evidence, not mere speculation. Today the decision makers affirmatively are
willing to make the necessary predictions only on rare occasions. There
is, for example, little guidance concerning how clear the evidence
must be before the enforcers will challenge, and the courts will block,
a merger because it might lead to another merger or to a merger wave. 117
To the extent this possibility is taken seriously, however, it could lead
to significantly stricter merger enforcement through the incipiency
doctrine. liB
Due in part to the relative nonenforcement of the incipiency doctrine,
market after market has come to be controlled by only a handful of
firms. For example, Von's Grocery blocked a merger in the Los Angeles
grocery market, which today is dominated by three large firms.119 Most
of the mergers that helped 120 consolidate the Los Angeles grocery market
115 SeeJaret Seiberg, From out of the Past, DAILY DEAL, June 26, 2000, available at http://
www.thedailydeal.com/features/todaysfeature/A24634-2000Jun26.html. The article discusses the decision by UAL to purchase US Airways for $11.6 billion, and how there were
widespread rumors that if this deal were permitted, it would be like to lead to similar
deals in the airline industry. See id. The article speculated that the deal could only be
blocked through the use of the incipiency doctrine, but quoted the Chairman of the FIC,
Robert Pitofsky that, "it would be 'unfair' to the merging companies to speculate over
whether these other deals really will happen .... 'There are so many rumors about so
many deals.' Pitofsky said, 'We don't take those into account.''' Id. at 3. But see supra note
86 for Chairman Pitofsky's remarks that seem to imply the contrary.
116 This reluctance could be caused by the enforcers' belief that the judges who would
hear their cases on appeal would be likely to be conservative and unlikely to uphold their
use of the incipiency doctrine. Aggressive enforcers might instead tighten enforcement
in more subtle ways, such as more tightly defined markets. See supra note 81.
117 Id.; see also supra notes 86 & 115. I am not aware of any empirical research on the
merger wave or "copycat" issues. Suppose, for example, that a merger is announced and
eight out of ten analysts who follow the industry predict that, if the merger were permitted,
there would soon be several additional mergers in the same industry. It would be very
useful to know how often this type of prediction is accurate.
liB Today we know a great deal more about the likely effects of mergers than we did a
generation ago, and there is little doubt that our ability to forecast will continue to improve.
In order to implement several of the incipiency mandates described in Part II, however,
the antitrust enforcers and the antitrust profession generally should concentrate more of
their efforts on learning how to make the appropriate forecasts with even more rigor and
confidence. We have to incorporate insights from investment bankers, industry specialists,
and forecasting experts of various types. Predictions are a necessary part of antitrust, and
the profession has been remiss in not having as a higher priority becoming better at this task.
119 The three largest firms were reported to have a combined total of approximately
59-67% of this market. See, e.g., Robin Fields & Melinda Fulmer, Markets' Shelf Fees Put
Squeeze on Small Firms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2000, at AI, available at 2000 WL 2205589;
Deborah Belgum, Upscale Chain Bristol Farms Launches Major Expansion Drive, L.A. Bus. J.,
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from 5,365 to its current level during the past half-century were beneficial
for consumers or, at worst, were harmless. But, increasingly, we are
starting to ask whether consumer welfare is best served by markets dominated by only three firms. There is, for example, recent literature which
suggests that food prices are higher in more highly concentrated grocery
retailing markets. 121 Perhaps in part for this reason, merger enforcement
has become more vigorous in recent years.
Even more vigorous enforcement could arise if the relevant decisionmakers believed, contrary to the conclusions of the more conservative
decisionmakers described in Part III, that the intellectual bases for strong
enforcement have not significantly been undermined and that stricter
enforcement would be in the public interest. They could be faithful to
the Congressional intent underlying the incipiency doctrine by their
more serious embrace of one or more of the meanings of incipiency
described in Part II.
As a concrete step, the Merger Guidelines could be revised to include
incipiency considerations in several ways: (l) the Guidelines could give
substantially more emphasis to the possibility that a merger might diminish non price aspects of consumer choice; (2) the Guidelines's introductory sections could explain Congress's desire for strict enforcement in
several ways, including a concern with small harms to competition, errors,
and probabilities; (3) the Guidelines could include, as a factor, whether
a merger is likely to spark an industry-wide trend or wave towards unduly
high levels of concentration; (4) the Guidelines could indicate that
anticompetitive effects are more likely to the extent that the HHI increase
Nov. 15, 1999, at 10, available at 1999 WL 11382499; Richard Turcsik, SeismicShiji, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Aug. 1, 1999, at 9, available at 1999 WL 9721173.
120 Many other factors were also at work.
121 One study concluded, "[O]ur results find a positive linkage between concentration
and prices even after holding costs and quality/service constant. The results of this study
are consistent with six other studies that found a significant positive relationship between
grocery store prices and the concentration of sales in local markets." Bruce W. Marion
et aI., Strategic Groups, Competition and Retail Food Prices, in COMPETITIVE STRA TEG YANALYSIS
IN THE FOOD SYSTEM 197 (Ronald W. Cotterill ed., 1993); see also Bruce W. Marion,
Competition in Grocery Retailing: The Impact of a New Strategic Group on BLS Price Increases, 13
REv. INDUS. ORG. 381, 398 (1998) (reporting the same results of the above study when
utilizing updated information); Ronald W. Cotterill, Market Power and the Demsetz Q!lality
Critique: An Evaluation for Food Retailing, 15 AGRIBUSINESS 101 (1999); Ronald W. Cotterill
et aI., Assessing the Competitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands, 73 J. Bus.
109 (2000); R. McFall Lamm, Prices and Concentration in the Food Retailing Industry, 30 J.
INDUS. ECON. 67 (1981); Frederick E. Geithman et aI., Concentration, Prices and Critical
Concentration Ratios, 63 REv. ECON. & STAT. 346 (1981); Bruce W. Marion et aI., Price and
Profit Performance of Leading Food Chains, 61 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 420 (1979); Ronald W.
Cotterill, Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont, 68 REv. ECON. &
STAT. 379 (1986).
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and postmerger HHI level are above the Guidelines's 100/1800 thresh01ds;122 and (5) the Guidelines could state that mergers likely to have
an initial anticompetitive effect within five years of the time when the
merger occurs will be blocked. 123
In addition, the term "incipiency," no matter how defined, has
acquired pejorative connotations, so there might be a disadvantage to
attempting to attach this label to the consumer choice characterization
of the antimerger laws. It might make more sense to use the approach
on its own. The idea that merger policy could center around consumer
choice has the advantage of being relatively new.124 The paradigm has
never been undermined directly by the literature which has weakened
our certainty over the extent to which concentration leads to higher
prices or profits. It has no awkward baggage and has never been rejected
by the courts, so its adoption would require no overturning of precedent.
It is both forward-looking and faithful to the letter and spirit of Philadelphia National Bank and other respected antitrust cases.
Revitalized merger enforcement under any of these approaches could
only happen, however, under special circumstances. It would require
the will of aggressive, risk-taking antitrust enforcers acting in a political
climate that was supportive and provided adequate enforcement budgets.
In addition, the main stumbling block to the revival of more robust
antimerger enforcement currently is the courts' lack of desire to implement such a policy, so the further revival of incipiency awaits judges who
will more faithfully implement congressional intent.
Since many mergers are abandoned after they are challenged, the
enforcers do have a limited ability to implement a weak version of the
incipiency doctrine even now. And, because the Merger Guidelines do
receive some respect from the courts, it certainly would be helpful to
122 For example, the Guidelines could contain a "presumption" that mergers above the
100/1800 thresholds will create market power, and a "very strong presumption" that
mergers above a 400/2500 threshold will create market power. Alternatively, the Guidelines
could state:
A merger that increases the HHI by more than 100 points to a level in excess
of 1800 points creates a rebuttable presumption that the merger will result in
significant anticompetitive effects. The greater the HHI increase and level, the
less likely that the factors contained elsewhere in these Guidelines will overcome
this presumption. For example, this presumption will rarely be overcome if this
increase exceeds 400 and the resulting level exceeds 2500.
123 The five-year period was chosen for illustrative purposes only. This period should,
however, be longer than the one-year parameters used elsewhere in the Guidelines.
124 Although the consumer choice approach to merger enforcement originated in Philadelphia National Bank, see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text, this history has largely
been forgotten.
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amend the Guidelines to better incorporate Congressional incipiency
concerns. 125 The merging parties know, however, that if they resist the
enforcers they are likely to have the issues decided by conservative judges,
so the enforcers can only pursue this approach so far. Even under the
best of assumptions, it is unclear how far this increased aggressiveness
could go. But the foundation for stricter merger enforcement through
the incipiency doctrine exists today.

125 If the Merger Guidelines are not amended and the enforcers tried, for example, to
block a merger on the grounds that it would be likely to cause a merger wave, defendants
would cite the Guidelines's omission of this factor as an additional reason for the court
to reject the argument.

